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Searching for Coherence in Global
Economic Policymaking
Pablo Zapatero*
Summary: The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
the World Trade Organisation have developed a coordination
structure aimed at achieving coherence in global economic
policymaking. This mechanism, promoting global state regulatory
convergence under the master value of economic liberalization,
excludes "non-economic" institutions. Searching for coherence in
global economic policymaking through this restricted approach
conflicts with the conventional meaning of "coherence" in
international law as coherence typically is defined as "the absence of
antinomies." Correcting this state of affairs requires deeper
coordination with the rest of "non-economic" global institutions and
deferring to their norms, expertise, and findings.
I. The Coordination of Global Economic Policymaking
The modern institutional architecture of global governance is
comprised of a group of coexisting and interrelated international regimes,
such as international institutions and treaties with a degree of
institutionalisation. These regimes consolidate horizontal networks of
inter-institutional relations on diverse stages of development. The
mechanism of coordination between the International Monetary Fund
("IMF" or "Fund"), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation
("WTO") stands out among them. This three-sided model of
coordination promotes the convergence of agendas and activities in the
areas of trade integration, development, and macroeconomic stability.
Therefore, it is a major "node" in the global regulatory network of the
world economy.1  The degree of development of this institutional
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1. For more on the growth of regulatory networks for the governance of the world
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framework contrasts with the relative fragility of its coordination vis-A-
vis other global institutions. The mechanism has been institutionalised
through a number of legal instruments which include references, as well
as inter-institutional agreements. It is, in fact, one of the most advanced
mechanisms of coordination in the practice of international institutional
law.
This mechanism completes the unfinished, post-World War I
international project of economic coordination known as the "Bretton
Woods System." The Conference of Bretton Woods, which took place in
New Hampshire in 1944, saw the creation of two financial institutions,
the IMF and the World Bank, and envisaged a third pillar, the
International Trade Organisation. This third institution, however, did not
come to fruition. In its stead, one of the chapters of its failed constitutive
treaty, the Havana Charter, was reformed to create the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") in 1947.2 This agreement
was applied "provisionally" for half a century before the cultural and
political conditions of the 1980s made it possible to initiate an ambitious
round of trade negotiations known as the Uruguay Round, which took
place from 1986 to 1994. The Uruguay Round gave birth to the WTO, a
significant upgrade from the previous institutional structure of GATT,
incorporated a package of administrative agreements in specific sectors,
and established new rules concerning coordination between the three
economic institutions.3 Thus, modern WTO law includes a normative
instrument aimed at encouraging coordination of the WTO with the IMF
and the World Bank. This instrument, named The Ministerial
Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organisation to
Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking of 15
December 1993, contains the so-called "Coherence Mandate," which
encourages the inter-institutional coordination of activities developed
under the broad objectives of their constitutive treaties.
As a result, the three economic institutions are involved in a process
economy, see Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The
Antinomies of the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 731-68 (1998).
2. For an explanation of the failure of the I.T.O. process, see William Diebold, Jr.
The End of the 1T.O, 16 ESSAYS IN INT'L. FIN. (1952); see also William Diebold, Jr.,
From the ITO to GATT-And Back?, THE BRETTON WOODS-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT
AND PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 152-73 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996).
3. Coordination is one of the WTO functions expressly included in Article III of its
constitutive treaty, together with facilitation of the administration of covered agreements
( 1), the incorporation of a permanent multilateral negotiating forum ( 2),
administration of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ( 3), and the administration of
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism ( 4). Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 ILM 1144 [hereinafter WTO].
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to produce synergies between their rules and policies.4  Trade
liberalisation is, in this sense, a global public policy where the purposes
of the three institutions intersect. In fact, it is a purpose of the Fund "to
facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of the productive
reserves of all members as primary objectives of economic policy."5 The
World Bank also has among its purposes "to promote the long-range
balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of
equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international
investment for the development of the productive resources of members,
thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and
conditions of labour in their territories. 6  These interrelated purposes
link directly with the purposes contained in the preamble of the WTO
agreement.
The charters of the three institutions contain provisions relating to
cooperation with other "intergovernmental organisations that have
[related] responsibilities" (WTO) 7 or with "any general international
organisations and with public international organisations having
specialized responsibilities in related fields" (IMF and World Bank).8 In
addition, Article III of the WTO agreement establishes as one of the five
functions of the organisational cooperation with the IMF, the World
Bank, and their related bodies "a view to achieving greater coherence in
global economic policymaking[.]" 9 Previously, coordination among the
so-called "sister institutions" has been more intense. Nowadays, the
Uruguay Round fully incorporates the multilateral trade system to this
scheme. 10 Thus, the Declaration on Coherence, which resulted from the
4. An overview of the various coordination activities of these institutions can be
found in WTO reports on coherence. The annual reports on coherence presented by the
Director General of the WTO and the annual joint reports of the three organisations are of
particular interest in this respect. For an introduction to inter-institutional coordination in
the economic sphere, see Christian Tietje, Global Governance and Inter-Agency Co-
operation in International Economic Law, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 501-15 (2002).
5. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60
Stat. 1401, 2 UNTS 39, art. I, ii [hereinafter IMF].
6. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, art. I, iii, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended Dec. 16,
1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294 [hereinafter World Bank].
7. WTO, supra note 3, at art. V. 1.
8. IMF, supra note 5, at art. X; World Bank, supra note 6, at art. V.8, A.
9. WTO, supra note 3, at art. 111.5.
10. For more on the complementary nature of the jurisdictions of these two
institutions, see Joseph Gold, The Relationship Between the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 499-520 (1982). For a critical overview, see
Richard E. Feinberg, The Changing Relationship Between the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, 42 INT'L ORG., 545-60 (1988).
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Uruguay Round, synthesises the shared vision of the three institutions.
The objective of the instrument is to promote the "coherence of global
economic policy-making" through coordination."1
The normative instruments resulting from the Uruguay Round also
include a declaration on the relationship of the WTO with the IMF, an
instrument that was adopted in 1994 and restates the relationship's
existing practices. The WTO law contains a complex set of references to
the IMF and international monetary law. In fact, these are the most
developed references of those incorporated in the law of the WTO. 12
Some notable provisions are those granting legal relevance to the Fund.13
GATT states that the WTO "shall consult fully with the International
Monetary Fund" (emphasis added) 14 when it is called upon to consider or
deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balance of payments,
or foreign exchange arrangements.1 5 This organisation "shall accept all
findings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund" (emphasis
added) 16 relating to these questions in the course of such consultations
such as the "determination of the Fund as to whether action by a
contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund." 17 The adoption of
final decisions at the WTO "shall accept the determination of the Fund
as to what constitutes a serious decline in the contracting party's
monetary reserves, a very low level of its monetary reserves or a
reasonable rate of increase in its monetary reserves, and as to the
financial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in such cases"
11. Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organisation to Achieving
Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Declaration on the Contribution
of the World Trade Organisation to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic
Policymaking, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Declaration on Consultation and
Coherence].
12. For an exhaustive list of the provisions relative to the IMF in the agreements
resulting from the Uruguay Round, see References to the International Monetary Fund in
the Agreements, Ministerial Decisions and Declarations Resulting from the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, WT/GCIW/80 (Mar. 10, 1998). For a detailed
description of WTO provisions referring to the IMF and their application, see Deborah
Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles of Agreement
and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 561-99 (2002).
13. See generally, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, at art. XV [hereinafter GATT]; see also General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation, Annex 1 B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
14. GATT, supra note 13, at art. XV.2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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(emphasis added).' 8
Additionally, Article XII of the GATS states that the Ministerial
Conference shall establish procedures for regular consultations with the
goal of enabling such recommendations to be made to the member
concerned. Article XII also establishes that "all findings of statistical
and other facts presented by the International Monetary Fund relating to
foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balance of payments, shall be
accepted and conclusions shall be based on the assessment by the Fund
of the balance of payments and the external financial situation of the
consulting Members" (emphasis added).' 9
In essence, these provisions expressly regulate the ex ante
acceptance by the WTO of findings and determinations produced by the
Fund in relation to trade restrictions based on balance of payments
considerations. The GATT provisions on balance of payments also are
supplemented by the understanding relating to interpretation of Articles
XII and XVIII.B.2 ° Interestingly, the WTO law includes various clauses
of conflict in favour of the IMF, both in the GATT and in the GATS.
Thus, Article XV of the GATT determines that Members "shall not, by
exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement,
nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.' At the same time,
Article XIV.9 of the GATT states that nothing in the Agreement shall
preclude the use of exchange controls or exchange restrictions "in
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund., 22 In addition, Article XI of the GATS, regarding payments and
transfers, establishes that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall affect the
rights and obligations of the members of the International Monetary
Fund under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund. 23 Finally, Article
XII.2 of the GATS, a provision on restrictions to safeguard the balance
of payments, states that these restrictions should all be consistent with
18. Id.
19. GATS, supra note 13, at art. XII.2, e.
20. The multilateral trading system and the IMF originally concentrated the greater
part of their collaboration on balances of payments disequilibrium. The IMF provides
assistance to countries implementing adjustment policies to correct those disequilibria.
The WTO Balance of Payments Committee evaluates in consultation with the Fund, the
suitability, opportunity and legality of (planned or adopted) trade restrictions on this
basis. See generally Frieder Roessler, The Relationship between the World Trade Order
and the International Monetary Fund, in THE LEGAL STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORDER: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 157-79 (Frieder Roessler ed.,
2000).
2 1. See GATT, supra note 13, at art. XV.4.
22. Id. at art. XV.9, a-b.
23. See GATS, supra note 13, at art. XI.2.
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the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.24
The multilateral trading system formally grants legal relevance to
the IMF determinations within its legal system and institutional structure.
The deference paid by the WTO to the Fund has a legal impact on the
functioning of the Balance of Payments Committee, the Special Groups,
and the Appellate Body. Thus, the IMF holds a position on the Balance
of Payments Committee, facilitating basic financial information of
member countries within consultation processes.2 5 At the same time, by
extension, it has certain legal status within the framework of the dispute
settlement mechanism. 26 Therefore, the law of the WTO has a relatively
structured network of provisions granting IMF legal relevance,
something which cannot be said for the remainder of the international
institutions having a bearing on the functioning of the multilateral trade
system. Inevitably, the absence of references granting relevance to other
international institutions and their rules makes a striking contrast with
this web of references to the Fund.
Coordination between the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank is
focused on achieving the "coherence" of their particular policies. The
main actors in the Uruguay Round negotiations were predisposed to
increase inter-institutional coordination in the economic field. Thus, the
group negotiating the Functioning of the GATT System ("FOGS")
tackled several approaches and ideas relating to "global economic
coherence. ' '27 As a result of this negotiating process, the Declaration of
Marrakesh expressly confirms the resolution of ministers "to strive for
greater global coherence of policies in the fields of trade, money and
finance, including cooperation between the WTO, the IMF and the
,,28ThfisWorld Bank for that purpose. The first milestone in this new process
is the mandate granted to the WTO Director General by the General
24. Id. at art. XI.1.
25. The Committee continues the general procedure known as full consultation
procedure for consultations on restrictions for reasons of balance of payments and the
simplified consultation procedure for developing countries. Balance of Payments Import
Restrictions-Consultation Procedures Documentation for Article XII(b) and Article
XVIII:(b) Consultations, L/3388 (Apr. 28, 1970), GATT B.I.S.D. (1 8th Supp.) at 48-53
(1972); Balance of Payments Import Restrictions Procedures for Regular Consultations
on Balance-of-Payment Restrictions with Developing Countries, L/3772/Rev.1 (Dec. 19,
1972), GATT B.I.S.D. (20" Supp.) at 47-9 (1974).
26. See Report of the Special Group, India-Quantitative Restriction to the Import of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999) [hereinafter
Report of the Spcial Group]; see also Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative
Restriction to the Import of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products,
WT/DS90/AB/R (Aug. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report].
27. World Trade Organisation, Functioning of the GATT System Group, Punta del
Este Declaration (Sept. 20, 1986), at Part E.
28. World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration of 15 April 1994,
MTN.TNC/W/143/Rev.1 3 (1994).
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Council to negotiate agreements on coordination. 29 These negotiations
produced two subtly balanced legal instruments that constituted a new
and singular model of inter-institutional coordination. Their main
function is the promotion of dialogue and communication, as well as
formal and informal institutional collaboration between these
institutions.30
The coordination structure was nurtured by shared visions and
cultural affinity. In this sense, the officials of the three institutions and
the representatives of their respective members tended to perceive their
purposes as interrelated. This perception has been reinforced in recent
decades and, as a result, these organisations promoted institutional
frameworks, aimed at contributing in a joint and coordinated way to the
growth and stability of the world economy. The first joint report of the
Managing Director of the IMF, the Director General of the WTO, and the
President of the Bank captures their perception in this regard when
stating that the three institutions share the objectives "within their
respective jurisdictions ' 31 of "facilitating the expansion of international
trade and thereby contributing to the promotion and maintenance of high
levels of employment and real incomes and to the efficient use of the
resources of all members, thus underpinning sustainable growth., 32 The
statement also emphasises that "[t]here is substantial agreement among
the three institutions as to the economic policies needed to achieve these
objectives" (emphasis added).33
From that common ground, ministers of trade and finance aspire to
promote coherence in global economic policies. This, no more and no
less, is their explicit institutional target and, as a result, in 1995, the
Executive Directors of the IMF and the World Bank and the Director
General of the WTO constituted a High Level Working Group on
Coherence aimed at developing coordination.34 The Director General of
the WTO explained this new development with full clarity to the General
Council in 1997: "our task on Global Coherence is new, and is very
29. See World Trade Organisation, General Council, Agreements Between the WTO
and the IMF and the World Bank, WT/L/194 (Nov. 18, 1996).
30. Id.
31. World Trade Organisation, General Council, Report of the Managing Director,
President and Director-General on Coherence, WT/GC/13 (Oct. 19, 1998).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 3.
34. World Trade Organisation, Statement of the Director General on Consultation
and Coherence, Agreements between the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank: Addendum,
WT/L/194/Add.1 (Nov. 18, 1996). Regular meetings are aimed at making
recommendations to develop practices and new tools for achieving coherence in global
economic policies. Id. See General Council, Report of the Managing Director, President
and Director-General on Coherence, WT/GC/1 3 (Oct. 19, 1998).
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important. 35  It also stated that the rule relating to consultations
contained in each of the agreements is in itself "a major and crucially
important achievement. 36 In this sense, "it provides us with what has up
until now been missing[:], 37  the formal engagement for the three
organisations "to address the coherence issue together. 38  Thus, this
structure finally completes the original project foreseen in Bretton
Woods.3 9  The ministries of finance and trade are effectively the
architects of a global coordination structure which responds solely to
their specialized competences.
Therefore, coordination is promoted through the rules contained in
their treaties, the new negotiated inter-institutional agreements, as well as
other, less formalised, processes. 40 Most of the resulting procedures and
processes of coordination focus on institutional communication,
dialogue, and sharing of information. In this sense, there are a high
number of both formal and informal technical consultations, tripartite
and bilateral meetings through which these institutions develop synergies
and avoid contradiction on matters of common interest. For example,
under this structure of coordination the IMF's policy advice on balance
of payments stability is required to take into due account the World
Bank's policy advice on sector reforms, and vice versa. In order to avoid
inconsistencies, the World Bank and the IMF's own missions in the field
also are instructed to consult with each other and WTO personnel on
issues of connected competence. Similarly, the WTO Secretariat and the
staff of the IMF and the World Bank participate in regular high level
consultation meetings. Moreover, several dialogue forums encourage the
exchange of information. These forums include the annual meetings of
the Governing Boards of the IMF and the World Bank, the Committee of
the IMF Executive Board on WTO-IMF Relations, the Development
Committee, the General Council of the WTO, and the High Level
Working Group on Coherence. In essence, coordination takes place
35. World Trade Organisation, Report by the Director-General, Agreements between
the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, WT/GC/W/68 (Nov. 13, 1997).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 2, 7.
39. There are some holistic views in respect to the functions of the three combined
institutions. The idea of being on the verge of creating an authentic "system of collective
economic security" is one of them. Peter Sutherland, Globalization and the Uruguay
Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL
152 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998).
40. The WTO Secretariat describes direct contact between officials as a
"decentralized process" to avoid bureaucracy, which functions "very well" both between
the institutions and within them. World Trade Organisation, Note by the Secretariat,
Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking and Cooperation between the WTO, the
IMF and the World Bank, WTiTF/COH/S/7 (Apr. 29, 2003), at 40.
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through diverse means.
However, this on-going process would serve no purpose without
domestic coordination at the inter-ministerial level. The formulation of
coherent economic policies begins at home. The WTO's Declaration on
Coherence specifically refers to this key issue stating, "[t]he task of
achieving harmony between these policies falls primarily on
governments at a national level, but their coherence internationally is an
important and valuable element in increasing the effectiveness of these
policies at a national level. 41  As Anne Krueger, the First Deputy
Managing Director of the IMF, points out, "to think that governments
can bypass in some way the crucial step-achieving consensus-and
achieve coherence between the management of the international
organisations is to create false expectations. 42
Any viable project aimed at achieving global economic
policymaking effectively begins with coordination at the domestic level.
However, modem heads of ministries and agencies with competence in
economic areas often tend to displace other branches of government from
the scenario of developing that consensus. The tendency towards "self-
containment" in modem domestic economic policy-making is reinforced
and amplified on a global scale through the WTO, the IMF, and the
World Bank. Consequently, the lower level of coordination between
these institutions and non-economic international institutions is a mere
global expression of the above mentioned domestic phenomenon.
Presently, domestic inter-ministerial disputes are conditioned and
influenced by international institutions. Under this new scenario,
ministries and agencies with competence in economic areas have
increased significantly their domestic decision-making power vis-A-vis
"non-economic" ministries and agencies. In this sense, global economic
institutions provide for a second level playing field for domestic inter-
ministerial politics. As a result, ministers of trade and finance solve a
growing number of domestic disputes in their favour by recalling the
rules and decision making procedures of those global economic
institutions. Therefore, coordinating the functioning of these institutions
can only increase their policy leverage.
II. Agreements and Coordination of Jurisdictions
The Uruguay Round has provided an opportunity to consolidate the
project of international economic coordination arising from Bretton
41. Declaration on Consultation and Coherence, supra note 11.
42. ANNE 0. KRUEGER, PROGRAM FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: ACHIEVING GREATER COHERENCE IN GLOBAL DECISION-MAKING 23-6,
28-9 (1998).
2006]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Woods. Agreements between the WTO and the IMF, as well as between
the WTO and the World Bank, are the first response to the WTO's
ministerial mandate to obtain, in cooperation with those institutions,
greater coherence in economic policy-making on a global scale. The first
sentence of both preambles states that these agreements establish new
rules for coordination in response to "the growing interactions between
economic policies pursued by individual countries arising from the
globalization of markets. 43
The WTO-IMF Agreement was signed at the beginning of the first
Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Singapore. This agreement
completes the traditional bilateral collaboration between these
institutions and incorporates a series of emerging institutional practices
dealing with issues such as information, communication, and research, in
addition to legal and jurisdictional issues.44 The WTO-IMF Agreement
grants both institutions reciprocal observer status in specific bodies,
formalizes communication channels, and promotes consultation and the
exchange of information.45  In this sense, it prescribes a series of
obligations in respect to the relevance of IMF decisions in the
functioning of the multilateral trade system.46 Additionally, the WTO-
IMF Agreement addresses the traditional role of the IMF within the
framework of the Balance of Payments Committee, making permanent
the provisional content of the December 1994 exchange of notes between
the IMF and the President of the former Committee on Restrictions to
Imports for Balance of Payments Purposes. 47 The text of the WTO-IMF
agreement also contains provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 48 The fact that IMF representatives
perceived several potential overlapping and/or conflicts of jurisdiction
led them to include the matter in negotiations. As a result, and following
43. World Trade Organisation, WTO Agreement with the Fund and the Bank: Annex
I-Agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade
Organisation, WT/GC/W/43 (Nov. 4, 1996), at Preamble [hereinafter WTO-IMF
Agreement]; see Agreement Between the International Monetary Fund and the World
Trade Organization, Dec. 9, 1996, reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Twenty-Ninth Issue, 2005); see
also Declaration on Consultation and Coherence, supra note 11, at 1.
44. WTO-IMF Agreement, supra note 43, at Preamble.
45. See id.
46. Paragraph 3 of the agreement establishes that the IMF should be informed of
several decisions in relation to both GATT and GATS: (a) restrictions on the making of
payments or transfers for current international transactions; (b) measures approving
discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices; and (c) measures
decisions requesting a Fund member to exercise controls to prevent a large or sustained
outflow of capital. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 5.
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a complex bargaining process, the agreement grants the IMF a presence,
albeit limited, in the procedures of the dispute settlement mechanism.
49
The agreement therefore provides for the WTO to invite the IMF to send
a member of its staff as an observer to its meetings "when questions of
jurisdictional importance for the IMF are to be considered."5 °  The
dispute settlement mechanism constitutes a useful type of tool for the
efficacy of international law. Understandably, its institutional attributes
are feared and respected by other international institutions that also apply
substantive treaty law but have a less effective institutional design. In
this scenario, however, the IMF, and to a lesser degree the World Bank,
have been the only international institutions with the political leverage to
obtain concessions in respect to the WTO dispute settlement
procedures. 51 The authority attributed to the IMF for providing
information on the compatibility of exchange measures adopted within
the framework of the WTO (i.e., acceptance of IMF findings and
determinations) includes the presentation of data and information for the
settlement of disputes. For this purpose, a communication mechanism
within the Dispute Settlement Body was incorporated in the agreement,
stating, "[t]he Fund shall inform in writing the relevant WTO body
(including dispute settlement panels) considering exchange measures
within the Fund's jurisdiction whether such measures are consistent with
the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.,
52
In an attached Comment, the Secretariat states that as a result of this
provision, "the IMF is obliged to inform any WTO body which examines
measures for change included in the IMF jurisdiction (including the
special dispute settlement groups) whether those measures are
compatible with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF."53  The
Comment adds that communications are to be official in nature, which
may imply their inclusion in the final reports of special groups.54
Moreover, the agreement establishes that the WTO will invite the IMF to
send a member of its staff to other meetings of the Dispute Settlement
Body and other WTO organs, with the exception of "special dispute
49. WTO-IMF Agreement, supra note 43, at 5.
50. Id. at 6.
51. The IMF had a special interest in respect to this mechanism in the negotiations;
the text of the agreement even determines that the agenda of the Dispute Settlement Body
shall be made available to the IMF. Paragraph 7 therefore establishes that the WTO will
place at the disposal of the IMF its agendas "at the same time as they are distributed in
the WTO," just as the IMF will do with the agendas of the meetings of the Executive
Board. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 8.
53. The agreement attaches an annexe with comments agreed to by both
organisations entitled Comments on the Agreement between the IMF and the WTO. See
id. at 14.
54. WTO-IMF Agreement, supra note 43, at 14.
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settlement groups."55 This "invitation" will be made by the WTO, prior
to consultations with its Secretary and IMF staff, when it reaches the
conclusion that IMF presence "would be of particular common interest
for both organisations. 56
Finally, the agreement states that the Director General of the WTO
and the Managing Director of the IMF "shall agree on appropriate
procedures for collaboration [on] . . . exchanges of views on
jurisdictional and policy issues"'57 for the purpose of ensuring
cooperation between the two institutions.58 Communication is generally
encouraged between the bodies of both organisations: "Each
organization may communicate its views in writing on matters of mutual
interest to the other organization or any of its organs or bodies (excluding
the WTO dispute settlement panels) and such views shall become part of
the official record of such organs and bodies." 59  The Comment
recommends these communications should be exclusively "to
communicate opinions on important questions of general policy and/or
competence., 60  Together with this formal mechanism, the WTO-IMF
Agreement gives rise to an informal device that Secretaries should use to
consult with each other in order to avoid, or at least reduce, any possible
conflict or contradiction. Thus, the IMF staff and the WTO Secretariat
will hold consultations on "issues of possible inconsistency between
measures under discussion with a common member" and that member's
obligations under the WTO Agreement or the IMF's Articles of
Agreement.61
The WTO-World Bank Agreement maintains a structure and
content that is similar to the WTO-IMF Agreement. It includes a
mechanism for consultation and the exchange of information between the
World Bank and the WTO on questions of common interest and provides
for the role of observers in specific bodies. The WTO-World Bank
Agreement also stipulates that the WTO Secretariat will be invited to
meetings of the Executive Board dealing with "general and regional trade
policy issues, including the formulation of World Bank policies on trade
55. The term includes "special groups, arbitrators, and the Appellate Body ... and
any other bodies of restricted composition constituted for the settlement of disputes" as
the comment on the agreement states. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id.
59. WTO-IMF Agreement, supra note 43, at 8.
60. Id. at Comment to 8.
61. The Comment also makes mention of the fact that the feedback provided by
these consultations "would not constitute an authoritative statement of the views of the
organisation and thus would not be binding." Id.
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matters. 62 At the same time, the President of the World Bank shall
recommend that the WTO Secretariat be invited to send an observer
when the consultations conclude that a particular meeting of the
Executive Directors will be examining "questions of special common
interest to both organisations.,, 63  Furthermore, the WTO-World Bank
Agreement adds that the WTO, in turn, will invite the World Bank to
send an observer to meetings of its bodies when the WTO and the World
Bank deem that these meetings will be examining "particular matters of
common interest to both organisations[,]" 64 with the exclusion of the
Dispute Settlement Body, special groups and the Appellate Body.65
Notwithstanding these agreements, the relations and the distribution
of jurisdiction between these institutions still pose complex questions.
For example, India-Agricultural Products is a clear case revealing the
inner legal frictions of the relationship between the IMF and the WTO.66
One of the central issues to this case was the degree of deference that the
special groups should give to the information provided by the IMF on the
purpose of complying with the obligation of "objective assessment" of
the matter.67
62. World Trade Organisation, WTO Agreement with the Fund and the Bank: Annex
II-Agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade
Organisation, WT/GC/W/43 (Nov. 4, 1996), at 4 [hereinafter WTO-World Bank
Agreement].
63. Id.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id.
66. The dispute originated in 1999 as a U.S. claim against India for infringing upon
Articles XI.1 and XVIII.11 of the GATT, which imposed quantitative restrictions on
agricultural, textile, and industrial products. In its defence, India alleged that the
measures adopted were applied to maintain its balance of payments under Article
XVIII.B of the GATT. Id. The decision of the special group and that of the Appellate
Body maintained, with different arguments, that the restrictions were not compatible with
WTO law. See Report of the Special Group, supra note 26; see also Appellate Body
Report, supra note 26.
67. Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states that every special
group should carry out "an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an
objective assessment of the facts of the case." Understanding the Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organisation, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), at Article 11 [hereinafter DSU]. Following India's
allegations, it is addressed whether special groups should accept the determination of
questions regarding of balance of payments made by the IMF pursuant to Article XV.2 of
the GATT ("What constitutes a serious decline in the contracting party's monetary
reserves." GATT, supra note 13, at art. XV.2.). The Special Group processed the
detailed arguments of the parties in respect of the obligation (1) to consult the IMF and
(2) to consider as conclusive the various IMF determinations pursuant to Article XV.2 of
GATT. Nevertheless, the Special Group maintained that there was no need to make a
decision on the issue, stating
[W]e accept in the circumstances of this case certain assessments of the IMF.
In this regard, however, we note that whether or not the provisions of Article
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The Appellate Body dealt with the question by recalling that Article
XV.2 of the GATT "requires panels, and not just the BOP [Balance of
Payments] Committee and the General Council, to accept the findings
and determinations of the IMF on the subjects specified in that
provision., 68 The Appellate Body concluded that the Special Group had
fulfilled its obligation given that the Special Group did not limit itself to
accepting the opinions of the IMF but "critically assessed these views
and also considered other data and opinions in reaching its
conclusions., 69 Later, the Appellate Body opted to abstain from taking a
legal position as this finding was not object of appeal.70 The Appellate
Body thus distanced itself from granting a "direct effect" to the decisions
of the IMF within dispute settlement procedures and, therefore, within
WTO law. 71 Nevertheless, it adopted a final solution in accordance with
the IMF determinations.72 In this sense, what the Appellate Body says
and does not say reveals that questions of jurisdictional competence
between both institutions are not fully settled. Therefore, the effects and
the reach of references to the IMF in WTO law are approached with
political caution.73
XV:2 extend to panels, the Panel has the responsibility of making an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the conformity with GATT 1994, as
incorporated into the WTO Agreement.
See Report of the Special Group, supra note 26, at 5.13; see also Appellate Body
Report, supra note 26; see Siegel, supra note 12, at 576-84 (commenting on the case).
68. Appellate Body Report, supra note 26, at 77.
69. Id. at 149.
70. Id. at 152.
71. The possibility of deviating from the provisions attributing relevance to the IMF
determinations in cases of balance of payments is always open. Special groups and the
Appellate Body may feel strongly pressured by WTO Members in relation to their
assessments on the IMF determinations. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, The Relationship of
WTO Obligations to Other International Agreements, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 168-71 (M.
Bronckers & R. Quick eds., 2000). The IMF has in the past made various interpretations
of the concept "restrictions" in its constitutive treaty taking into consideration that some
are under the jurisdiction of GATT. See Gold, supra note 10, at 415.
72. Frieder Roessler, former Director of Legal Affairs at the GATT from 1989-1995,
empasizes that the IMF cannot be effective in the function attributed to it in Article XV,
regarding exchange arrangements, in the current system of flexible exchange rates. See
Roessler, supra note 20, at 157-79. The main objective of the IMF was to attain stability
and convertibility of currencies. See id. Today, however, the convertibility is
generalised and the exchange rates are not fixed. See id. As a result, the provisions of
balance of payments, which were part of the monetary system designed to prevent
competitive devaluations, are currently employed as "legal coverage" in order to use
trade restrictions as substitutes for devaluations. See id. Consequently, these provisions
have not been applied in an adequate manner since the collapse of the parity system. See
id. Thus, the Committee on Balance of Payments has not once decided that import
controls were unjustified for reasons of balance of payments given that there are no
agreed criteria for taking a decision on this basis. See Roessler, supra note 20, at 157-79.
73. For reflections on the compulsory or non-compulsory nature of the IMF
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There is no neutral jurisdictional forum or procedure to solve
conflicts between WTO and the IMF, but several references and causes
of conflict exist without an available external mechanism to adjudicate
them.74 In this respect, the coordination structure set up by the IMF, the
World Bank, and the WTO shows that relations between international
institutions cannot be governed in practice by means of applying rules of
conflict in public international law. This mechanism of coordination
erects an effective means of informally settling controversial legal issues,
thus reducing the likelihood of possible conflicts through socialisation.
However, the risk of antinomy in itself is inevitable.75 The existence of
coordinated structures can not fully remove the prospect of conflict,
whether these are conflicts of treaties or conflicts of jurisdiction.
International institutions implement the rules contained in the
treaties they administer as well as subsequent rules adopted under their
decision making procedures. However, as the practice of international
law reflects, these rules can be incompatible with other treaties.
Therefore, several types of conflict may arise: (1) horizontal conflicts
between the rules for these treaties (A-B); (2) horizontal conflicts
between acts and measures deriving from the treaties administered by
these institutions (a-b); and (3) conflicts between a treaty administered
by one institution and acts and measures deriving from the treaty of
another (A-b or a-B).7 6  Consequently, since there are no specific
procedures for solving antinomies and conflicts, inter-institutional
coordination through communication, dialogue, and diplomacy is called
to be an essential function to supplement the practices of these
institutions.
Mechanisms of coordination between international institutions
cannot prevent conflicts from arising; however, they can inhibit or
mitigate them. These mechanisms create frameworks of socialisation
that restrain or reduce legal frictions and facilitate a consensual solution
to antinomies and conflicts between institutions. In essence, the main
challenge lies in those complex issues which, although they are the
jurisdictional competence of a particular international institution,
determinations in the procedures of the dispute settlement mechanism, see Martha Rutsel
Silvestre, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in World Trade Law, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 67,
71-4 (1997).
74. Gold, supra note 10, at415.
75. With respect to questions of jurisdiction between IMF and GATT in the field of
trade restrictions based on balance of payments considerations, see Gold, supra note 10 at
354-9, 425-31, 451-81.
76. For an interesting case in which the interaction between adjustment programs
and WTO law is discussed, see Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting
Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27,
1998); see also Siegel, supra note 12, at 572-6 (commenting on this case).
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nevertheless remain in grey areas, or areas of concurring jurisdiction
with other institutions. Even so, the management of global public affairs
through law is faced with a growing complexity that will inevitably
increase the overlapping of jurisdictions. In this sense, we live in a
world of interdependent jurisdictions both on an interstate scale and
between global institutions. Therefore, the perimeter of exclusive
competences should be reduced in favour of schemes in which the
primary responsibility of each international institution is complemented
by secondary responsibilities of others: a system of shared competences.
At the same time, the present political scenario is one of common
interests, overlapping mandates, and complementary functions. In this
sense, modem global policymaking clearly is characterized by
entwinement.
As a result, the superposition and complementary character of
mandates, competences, and functions between these institutions
inevitably encourages coordination of their jurisdictions. International
capital movements are a clear example of concurrence and jurisdictional
allocations and reallocations in the economic field. Capital account
convertibility interested both the IMF and the WTO following the
debacle of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment Agreement
in 1998. 77 However, the shared interest in this field should be tackled
with care since there are points of jurisdictional overlap between both
institutions.78 The same applies to the link between liberalisation of
77. In 1997, the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International
Monetary System recommended an amendment to the Articles of the Agreement to
include within its competence the liberalisation of capital movements. The Asian crisis
led to a suspension of the project because it demonstrated the link between the
liberalisation of the capital account and the rise in vulnerability of national economies.
Technically, for the purpose of granting jurisdiction to the IMF in matters of
liberalisation of capital account, it would be required to eliminate Article VI, Section 3,
on the control of capital transfers and, to amend Article VIII on general obligations of
members. For two studies of special interest crafted from the experience of the legal
department of the IMF, see JOSEPH GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER
THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 21,
Washington D.C) (1977) and Franqois Gianviti, The IMF and the Liberalization of
Capital Markets, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L., 733, 773-83 (1997); see also, Cynthia Crawford
Lichtenstein, International Jurisdiction over International Capital Flows and the Role of
the IMF: Plus qa Change, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 61-80 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000). On the pros and cons of the IMF
assumption of jurisdiction in matters of liberalisation of capital account, see Gilbert
Irwin, Christopher L. Gilbert, & David Vines, How Should the IMF View Capital
Controls?, in THE IMF AND ITS CRITICS: REFORM OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE 181-206 (David Vines & Christopher L. Gilbert eds., 2004).
78. Note that Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), GATS, and GATT have
points of connection with capital movements. During the Doha Round negotiations,
some developing countries maintained a position favouring the use of trade restrictions
for reasons of balance of payments in cases of crisis of capital accounts. The IMF
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trade in financial services and capital account liberalisation. The Doha
negotiations on market access in financial services and the GATS rules
also clearly connect with IMF activities such as policy advice and the
promotion of financial stability.7 9 Additionally, relations between trade
and exchange rate stability require the IMF and the WTO to take a
careful approach in cases such as devaluation measures deriving from
IMF programs, which may negatively affect trade transactions from third
parties.8°
III. Promoting a Process of Regulatory Convergence
The coordination structure of the IMF, the World Bank, and the
WTO also promotes state regulatory convergence in several policy areas,
in addition to facilitating arrangements concerning jurisdiction. Their
coordinated public policies aim at opening markets and preserving
market openness. A major feature of the construction of the global
political economy is the development and management of linkages
intervened in response to consultation with the WTO and maintained that these measures
could only be used in "extreme" situations of current account crisis and should take the
form of a temporary uniform tariff on all imports. See World Trade Organisation, Note
on Issues Raised by Developing Countries in the Doha Round, Communication from the
International Monetary Fund, Trade Restrictions for Balance of Payments Purposes,
WT/TF/COH/13 (Feb. 14, 2003). The participation of domestic economies in the
international capital markets distorts this tool and affects the assumptions of GATT rules
and procedures on balance of payments, since it increases the influence of the capital
account on the situation of balance of payments (e.g., the Asian financial crises). In this
respect, trade restrictions are not adequate tools for addressing and correcting balance of
payments deficits resulting from incidents and events relating to capital account. On
these questions and the assessment of the sufficiency of monetary reserves, see World
Trade Organisation, Note by the Secretariat, The Treatment of "Monetary Reserves" in
WTO Balance of Payments Committee Consultations, WT/TF/COH/S/2 (June 18, 1999).
79. The GATS and its Schedules of Commitments clearly reveals this interaction.
Thus, for example, the prudential clause in the GATS Annex on Financial Services,
which allows Member States to adopt restrictive measures on financial services with the
object of safeguarding the integrity of their financial systems, concurs and interacts with
IMF policies of strengthening the financial sector and international financial stability, as
well as its monitoring activities and technical assistance on practices of supervision and
prudential rules.
80. Exchange rates stability is critical for international trade. Overcoming financial
crises at the end of the nineties was dealt with by important devaluations, which resulted
from IMF programs, although some WTO Members considered the devaluations "unfair
trade." This is an issue on which both institutions must work and discuss. For a clear
explanation of the resulting situation of the intervention of Korea in the meeting of the
General Council on Coherence in 2003, see General Council on Coherence, Coherence in
Global Economic Policymaking: Minutes of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/79 (June 25, 2003),
at 74-81. During the Uruguay Round, the GATT Contracting Parties requested a report
from the IMF on the effects of volatile exchange rates in international trade, but did not
negotiate any instrument in this respect. See International Monetary Fund, Exchange
Rate Volatility, and World Trade-Occasional Paper, 28 (1984).
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among related regulatory regimes. 81 The master value underlying this
process is economic liberalisation. In the specific case of the three
international economic institutions, regulatory convergence is promoted
through the combined techniques of market access through the WTO and
access tofinance through the IMF and the World Bank.
Access to markets and finance are the main regulatory tools
administered by WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. On one hand, the
WTO regulates state behaviour through the market. The market is
expanded through a multilateral forum of permanent trade negotiations
and is regulated by a broad range of legal rules which are adjudicated by
a dispute settlement system authorizing trade sanctions. Thus, the
instruments administering multilateral market access constitute an
efficient tool that gives direction to domestic public policies. Therefore,
market access complements the regulatory tools of the IMF and the
World Bank. For their part, the IMF and the World Bank regulate state
behaviour through access to finance, a regulatory tool that is based on
programs of financial assistance that incorporate several types of
conditionality. 82 In the same way, the content of these programs gives
direction to domestic public policies of borrowing countries.83
81. See Picciotto, supra note 1, at 731.
82. The tool of conditionality is the IMF's own creation and has an imprecise legal
basis in its Articles of Agreement.
The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including
policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for
special balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve their
balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary
use of the general resources of the Fund.
IMF, supra note 5, at art. V.3 a.
The first instrument regulating the principles which govern the use of resources is a
May 1979 Decision on the Guidelines on Conditionality adopted by the Executive
Directory. For an academic monograph on IMF conditionality from an international legal
perspective, see ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY (1996). For a
critical research from the G24 analysis program, see Ariel Buira, An Analysis of IMF
Conditionality, in CHALLENGES TO THE WORLD BANK AND IMF: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
PERSPECTIVES (Ariel Buira ed., 2003).
83. The IMF has various services providing access to funding which uses
conditionality. The traditional Structural Adjustment Facility and the Extended Fund
Facility IMF services (SAF-EFF 1974) for balance of payments dysfunctions therefore
coexist with other new vehicles for access to funding, which the IMF has devised and
reformed: (1) Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF 1999), which replaces the
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF 1987); (2) the Emergency Aid
Mechanism (1995); Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF 1997); and the Compensatory
Financing Facility (CFF 1963). All these services, except the PRGF and the Emergency
Aid Mechanism, operate through non-concessionary loans with rate of charge set at
market price. For an overview, see International Monetary Fund, Policy Development
and Review Department, Review of Fund Facilities-Preliminary Considerations (Mar.
2, 2000). For the decisions of the Executive Board on the reform of non-concessionary
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These two regulatory tools converge through inter-institutional
coordination. Since they increase pressure on domestic policies through
their combined positive and negative incentives, they generate a
reinforced effectiveness. The programs of the World Bank and the IMF
impose obligations by granting or denying financial assistance; WTO
law imposes obligations by granting or denying access to the market.
From a technical perspective, the two regulatory tools use provisions of a
different flexibility. Thus, the tools of the IMF and the World Bank
employ rules derived from treaty-based programs where compliance is
promoted by refusal or suspension of financial aid. Conversely, the
WTO employs treaty rules where compliance is promoted by both trade
concessions and suspension of trade concessions. Consequently, the
aggregate efficacy of the law of these institutions benefits from two
systems of incentives which are increasingly coordinated.
Their combined rules provide "muscle" to global liberalisation. In
this way, their obligations are based on treaty-based programs and these
treaty rules create a "legal circuit," encouraging a global process of state
regulatory convergence based on market openness. 84  However, it is
important to note that, in relation to the functioning of this circuit, these
institutions are required to avoid formal cross-conditionality. 5 Thus,
both the IMF and the Bank have not only restructured their conditionality
but, as explained below, now also are focusing on the promotion of
autonomous liberalisation measures.
The measure of global public power held by the three organisations
within the global institutional architecture cannot be increased by their
present coordination structures. The relations between the institutions
composing this triad take varied routes. The diverse intensities in the
bilateral relations between the three organisations are different for
historical and cultural motives, as well as for reasons of functionality and
opportunity. Therefore, the IMF-World Bank relationship has been more
dynamic and intense, not only for historical reasons, but for practical
reasons. In this sense, developed countries have more autonomy and
margins of discretionary power within the structures of these two sister
services, see International Monetary Fund, Legal, Policy Development and Review,
Review of Fund Facilities-Decisions and Treasurers Departments (Nov. 28, 2000).
84. This circuit indirectly feeds back the acceptance of new obligations, the
negotiation of new norms, and the signing of treaties. Requirements of cross GATT-IMF
and World Bank-IMF membership are themselves structural elements of this circuit. The
World Bank and the IMF are sister institutions that were designed to work jointly and in a
complementary manner. Thus, the World Bank's membership is dependent on the
membership of the IMF. IMF, supra note 5, at art. VI.3. In the same way, WTO
Members are required to be Members of the IMF or, failing this, to conclude a special
exchange agreement. GATT, supra note 13, at art. XV.6.
85. Declaration on Consultation and Coherence, supra note 11, at 5.
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institutions through the structure of voting rights than in the collective
decision-making structures of the WTO, which are based on the
consensus rule.86 This type of environment, best suited for powerful
minorities, also is present in forums such as G7/8 and connected or
related groups and clubs, 87 while parallel to it are a series of global
regulatory agencies assist the process of regulatory convergence."
Resulting from this scenario, these three "combined regimes" manage an
intensive multi-state legal transplant of predefined economic models,
rules, and institutions under the coordinated implementation of their
functional competences on macroeconomic and financial stability, trade
promotion, and development.
The bilateral coordination of the multilateral trading system with the
IMF and the World Bank, known as the Coherence Mandate, has
increased considerably since the Uruguay Round. At the same time, the
traditional bilateral coordination between the IMF and the World Bank
89has been strengthened significantly and has intensified in recent years.
This strategy of intensifying bilateral coordination between the sister
institutions began when the IMF Managing Director and the World Bank
President agreed to reform their collaboration procedures and practices in
1998.90 At that time, the IMF and the World Bank concentrated their
86. The exercise of power inside the IMF, for example, shows that the central
political weight is exercised by the United States and is followed at a distance by a group
of European States attached to a weak coordination mechanism both within and outside
this institution (external relations of the Economic and Monetary Union). For a full
analysis of the distribution of competences between the European Union and the Euro
Zone countries and its coordination inside the international monetary system, see
MANUEL LOPEZ ESCUDERO, EL EURO EN EL SISTEMA MONETARIO INTERNACIONAL (2004).
87. See International Monetary Fund, A Fact Sheet: A Guide to Committees, Groups,
and Clubs (Aug. 27, 2004).
88. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and the Financial Stability forum are among the most
influential agencies. The Financial Stability forum is a good example of the type of inter-
institutional artefacts resulting from collective interaction and partnerships between
international regulatory institutions and agencies. See George Walker, A New
International Architecture and the Financial Stability Forum, in THE REFORM OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 119-53 (Rosa M. Lastra ed., 2001). Paul
Stephan coined the term "new international law" to refer to a legal and regulatory
phenomenon which transcends what is traditionally considered to be public international
law and extends to a diverse group of international agencies that produce regulation. See
Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1555, 1555-87 (1999).
89. For an overview of the areas where collaboration between the Bank and the IMF
has intensified, see International Monetary Fund, Strengthening IMF-World Bank
Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality--Progress Report (Aug. 19,
2002).
90. International Monetary Fund, Report of the Managing Director and the
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efforts on delimiting primary responsibilities. 91 As a result, both
financial institutions have been involved in a joint process of program
design, aimed at rationalizing the content and formulation of
conditionality. 92 In recent years, this process has produced an ordered
division and distribution of conditions focused on avoiding duplication
or overlapping, 93 as well as formal cross-conditionality. 94
President on Bank-Fund Collaboration (Joint Guidelines), SM/98/226 (Sept. 4, 1998).
This document led to a joint report on the reinforcement of the framework of
coordination in their country policies and procedures. See also International Monetary
Fund, Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and
Conditionality, SM/01/219 (Aug. 23, 2001).
91. This demarcation determines the World Bank's central focus as providing
assistance to countries to reduce poverty, concentrate on the structural and social agenda,
including the public and financial sector, and address the institutional and environmental
dimensions of development. The IMF is responsible for macroeconomic stabilisation,
monetary, fiscal and exchange rates policies, in addition to related structural and
institutional measures and issues relating to the functioning of domestic and international
financial markets. International Monetary Fund, Report of the Managing Director and
the President on Bank-Fund Collaboration (Joint Guidelines), SM/98/226 (Sept. 4,
1998).
92. Several IMF self-attributed competences are being questioned in the legal
literature on the field. For example, Eva Riesenhuber maintains there was an absence of
legal basis for IMF actions in handling the Asian crises, when it provided funds to restore
confidence in the markets, as well as using conditionality to carry out structural reforms
in areas not having a direct impact on the balance of payments. Furthermore, in her
opinion, these actions should be considered ultra vires in the light of IMF's Articles of
Agreement and international law. EVA RIESENHUBER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND UNDER CONSTRAINT: LEGITIMACY OF ITS CRISIS MANAGEMENT 350, 402 (2001).
93. Practice reveals a degree of duplication of conditions in the IMF and World
Bank programs when both institutions consider a particular measure to be critical for
their effectiveness. In these cases, the sister institutions attempt to harmonise their
conditionality. International Monetary Fund, Strengthening IMF-World Bank
Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality-Progress Report, 10 (Aug.
19, 2002).
94. The term "cross-conditionality" refers to the duplication and linkage between the
conditions of two organisations. Its use originated in the relationship between the two
financial institutions, although it now also is applied to their relationship with the WTO.
Declaration on Consultation and Coherence, supra note 11, at 5. With respect to
bilateral World Bank-IMF relations, each organisation currently disassociates the
decisions it adopts within the framework of its programs from compliance with
conditions of the other financial institution. The bodies of each institution function in an
independent manner, applying the provisions of their constitutive treaty and
complementary rules and regulations. Nevertheless, practice shows that inter-
institutional coordination enables similar effects to be produced by reaching consensus on
objectives and organising a division of labour. In this respect, it is possible to speak of
measures of equivalent effect to cross-conditionality. Inter-institutional communication
and dialogue encourages informal coordination and convergence and, therefore,
transcends the formal technical question of cross-conditionality. Official discourse may,
as a result, maintain that both institutions operate autonomously and independently.
Those tools promoting consultations, contacts, cross-communication between these
organisations and policy advice contribute to this result. The term "informal cross-
conditionality" is used to refer to this phenomenon on occasion. Nicholas Kremmydas
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The existence of diverse fields of jurisdictional interaction between
the IMF and the World Bank drove them to establish, as a principle of
their relationship, the maintenance of conditionality in those domestic
reforms that each organisation deemed critical for the success of their
programs.95 Thus, the 2002 revised version of the IMF Guidelines on
Design and Implementation of Conditionality starts to rationalise
conditions and concentrates efforts on avoiding overlapping.96
Duplication of conditions is mitigated by the collaborative demarcation
between "critical areas" and "non-critical areas." As a result, there has
been a considerable average reduction in the conditions of IMF loans.
However, conditions removed from its programs are often assumed by
the World Bank. Therefore, coordination facilitates the phenomenon of
transplanting conditions. Both institutions have also designed a Note on
the Guidelines addressing the improvement and increase of
coordination.97 This instrument creates a basic framework for policy
coordination on country programs, based on three main strategies:
(1) the division of work and staff operations in the field (country
programs) based on the principle of "lead agency;" (2) the strengthening
of cross-communication on the priorities for reform, conditionality, and
implementation of programs; and (3) the promotion of early and
systematic collaboration aimed at resolving any possible difficulties in
the first stages of the process of drafting country policies.
In this respect, therefore, the principle of "lead agency" is
instrumental to the prevention of conflicts of competence and to the
coordination of both institutions on specific policy areas. In fact, it
maintains, for example, that informal cross-conditionality is the rule rather than the
exception. Nicholas Kremmydas, The Cross-Conditionality Phenomenon-Some Legal
Aspects, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SIR JOSEPH GOLD 197-8, 218 (Werner F. Ebke &
Joseph J. Norton eds., 1990).
95. International Monetary Fund, Strengthening IMF- World Bank Collaboration on
Country Programs and Conditionality, SM/01/219 (Aug. 23, 2001).
96. In an effort to improve effectiveness of the programs, the Guidelines were
revised for the second time in 2002. This second revision, led by Horst K6hler, was
authorised and approved by the Executive Board in 2000. The Guidelines concentrate on
the macroeconomic objectives of the IMF and, in turn, outline competences with the
World Bank. They aspire to increase effectiveness, clarify provisions, and adapt
conditions to the circumstances and capabilities of each country and coordinating with
other institutions. See International Monetary Fund, Legal and Policy Development and
Review Departments, Guidelines on Conditionality (Sept. 25, 2002). From a legal
perspective, the Guidelines are a mere instrument of soft law produced by the Executive
Board to "interpret" the meaning of "adequate safeguards" in the Purposes portion of the
IMF Agreement ("To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards." IMF, supra note 5, at
art. 1.5.). See Gold, supra note 10, at 352.
97. See International Monetary Fund, Staff Guidance Note, Operationalizing Bank-
Fund Collaboration in Country Programs and Conditionality (April 2002).
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allocates the exercise of competence for a given policy area in
accordance with the institutional expertise of each organisation. The
idea of "lead agency" may resolve, in a decentralised way, many minor
questions of jurisdictional competence when implementing their policies
in a given country. In this sense, the lead agency handles dialogue with
the government on substantive questions and gives policy advice to the
other institution on the design and policy content of conditionality. In
practice, this situation can produce some type of informal institutional
hierarchy between both institutions with respect to specific policy areas
in a given country. Logically, the precise determination of the "lead
agency" is less clear in some areas such as budgetary management
reform, and reform of the financial sector. Therefore, defining
jurisdictional competence through the principle of "lead agency" requires
precise rules and procedures to avoid its determination from becoming
the product of mere rotation or power balances.
Another relevant example of economic coordination is the joint
explorations by the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO with respect to
"autonomous liberalisation measures." These measures are state
measures of trade liberalisation adopted either voluntarily or with a
stimulus, such as financial assistance from the IMF or the World Bank.
These measures do not produce consolidated concessions and
commitments in the WTO. Thus, autonomous liberalisation adopted
under IMF or the World Bank programs may technically be withdrawn
by a country once its government is no longer subject to the pressure of
refusal or suspension of a loan. Thus, formulas and procedures are being
explored by these institutions and the WTO in order to grant "credits" in
multilateral trade negotiations to autonomous liberalisation measures; in
other words, creating a "market" in which these credits may be
exchanged for trade concessions in WTO negotiations. The liberalisation
agenda of the three institutions therefore converge in a particular
imaginative mechanism that allows countries to obtain market access in
exchange for consolidating autonomous liberalisation measures.98
The transformation of these measures into consolidated
commitments thus would transform an additional sequence of trade
liberalisation into binding international law. As a result, this regulatory
chain would end up producing hard-law. 99  Consequently, the
98. The design of mechanisms for obtaining credit and/or recognition of negotiations
has long been a matter for discussion. In this respect, a distinction was made between the
concept of credit (linked to the consolidation of tariffs) and recognition (based on
autonomous trade liberalisation initiatives). World Trade Organisation, Note by the
Secretariat, Autonomous liberalisation of Trade, MTN.TNC/I l/Rev.1 and
WT/TF/COH/S/1 (June 18, 1999).
99. Under this scheme, the promotion of autonomous trade liberalisation measures
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autonomous liberalisation measure would be transformed into a trade
concession, subject to the general WTO disciplines, and, therefore, to the
common regime of exceptions, safeguards, and escape clauses of WTO
law. For the present, methods have been adopted for dealing with
autonomous liberalisation in services. 00 Countries adopting these types
of measures can negotiate a credit with other trade representatives, prior
to consolidating them on their lists of GATS commitments. For each
round of negotiations, the Council for Trade in Services will establish
guidelines for negotiations on the liberalisation of services and, within
these guidelines, the Council will determine ways of dealing with
autonomous liberalisation measures adopted from previous negotiations.
It is not possible to speculate on whether or not this new regulatory
development will be successful or if a suitable formula for trade in goods
could be developed in the future. Nevertheless, this paradoxical idea of
using market tools to legally formalize global liberalization is the clear
expression of a particular type of market-driven thinking.
Interestingly, the exercise of soft-power by these institutions
recently has been directed at the promotion of international trade
lawmaking through IMF lending. The WTO Members, its Secretariat, as
well as the IMF and the World Bank, are fully aware of the risks of a
second failure following the demise of the Millennium Round in 1999.
There is much at stake in the Doha Round because the specialised legal
system of the WTO is required to be relatively dynamic in order to be
effective.101 It is for this reason, in fact, that Article 111.2 of the WTO
agreement defines the multilateral trade system as a permanent forum of
negotiations. Therefore, the process of trade liberalisation encouraged
by the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank is dependent on regular
multilateral lawmaking. As a result, the Executive Directors of the IMF,
by IMF and World Bank programs essentially function in the following manner: (1) the
IMF or the World Bank grants Country X a loan conditioned to the adoption of specific
autonomous liberalisation measures; (2) Country X adopts those temporary measures to
obtains resources; and (3) WTO grants Country X a "negotiation credit" in relation to
those measures to obtain concessions and improve market access at WTO negotiating
table. In essence, this institutional scheme could make it possible to close the circle and
displace a temporary autonomous liberalisation measure, promoted by IMF or the World
Bank, to a consolidated WTO commitment, subject to the disciplines of WTO law.
100. World Trade Organisation, Special Session for the Council of Trade in Services,
Modalities for the Treatment ofAutonomous Liberalisation, TN/S/6 (Mar. 10, 2003).
101. The urge faced by the WTO is explained with clarity by what is known as the
"bicycle theory" in international trade. The theory essentially suggests that WTO is
inevitably forced to manage a continuous process of multilateral liberalisation. In other
words, in order not to fall off, there has to be constant pedalling. For more on the bicycle
theory, see generally C. FRED BERGSTEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER: SELECTED PAPERS OF C. FRED BERGSTEN 1972-1974 209-24 (1975); see also
JOSEPH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 40-2 (1988).
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together with the WTO Secretariat, have devised an innovative tool to
promote consensus in the Doha Round: the Trade Integration
Mechanism. 102 This mechanism promotes the development of new trade
rules by providing financial assistance to cover some specific short-term
adverse effects that these rules could cause developing countries.
103
Under this instrument, IMF financial assistance is granted through an
agreement with the borrowing country or through a program already in
operation. In IMF terminology, the aim is to ensure that the risk of any
negative short term effect on the balance of payments will not dissuade
developing countries from committing to the liberalisation of
international trade. In this sense, the IMF designed this mechanism as an
anticipatory tool seeking to facilitate adjustment.
The prospective economic analysis of the IMF, the World Bank, and
WTO anticipates that the expected aggregated benefits of Doha do not
exclude adjustment costs in developing countries. The instrument covers
the adverse effects of liberalisation in third countries on developing
countries. It is assumed that new rules could generate a negative short
term effect on third party balance of payments as a result of, for example,
the increase in competition in the textile sector, the erosion of
preferential market access for specific products such as textiles products
and sugar, or reforms on agricultural subsidies. Therefore, qualifying to
obtain funds is dependent on the adverse impact from increases in market
access by other countries (e.g., preferential access) or from other
countries withdrawing trade subsidies (e.g., negative effects of the
withdrawal of export subsidies in Country A on Country B which
imports those products). Although the IMF has presented this
mechanism as a "safeguard" and an "insurance policy," it is, in practice,
a mere loan covering short-term adverse effects of liberalization by third
102. International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Department,
Fund Support for Trade-Related Balance of Payments Adjustments (Feb. 27, 2004). This
new "policy," as described by the IMF, has precedent in the Compensatory Financing
Facility. The IMF created this tool to assist countries that felt affected by the shocks and
global fluctuations of basic product prices (temporary reductions in exports), which result
partly from deficiencies in the multilateral trade system. The mechanism has been rarely
used and has been reformed on several occasions to include other functions. See
International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Department, Review of
the Compensatory Financing Facility (Feb. 18, 2004).
103. It is interesting to note that the General Council of the WTO still resists granting
observer status in the Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiary bodies. This
status has been requested on various occasions throughout the Doha process and has even
implicated in its favour, yet without success, the Director General of the WTO. These are
his words before the General Council in relation to the issue: "At a time when the WTO
[is] looking for assistance from these institutions, it [is] important that the WTO
implement its part of the cooperation agreement fully and so help them to help the
WTO." World Trade Organisation, Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking-
Minutes of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/79 (June 25, 2003).
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countries. 104 This mechanism has its detractors and it is not possible to
predict whether it will be used or not. However, irrespective of its
success or failure, it has a special interest as a policy tool by linking
financial assistance with advances in international economic
lawmaking. 105
Finally, the coordination between these economic institutions also is
promoted through the collaborative production and dissemination of
ideas. In this sense, the convergence towards market openness is
supported by policy advice, technical assistance, and capacity building
strategies based on developing pro-liberalization research. These
institutions allocate significant human and material resources to the
development of a common "scientific" discourse that has a bearing on
both domestic and global policymaking. In this respect, there is an
imbalance of resources in favour of the World Bank and the IMF, in
comparison to other international institutions, when it comes to
exercising "voice." Research programs, technical assistance, and policy
advice and assessment are some of the means to pursue this goal. This
fact is important since both functions of analysis and dissemination of
ideas help to build consensus between and within governments in many
occasions. 106
In essence, the production and dissemination of ideas by these
institutions facilitates the reform of domestic institutions, laws, and
regulation. Resources are allocated to the development of research
104. See Anne Krueger, International Monetary Fund Deputy Managing Director,
Address at the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference: A New Proposal From the IMF (Sept.
10, 2003); see also Anne Krueger, International Monetary Fund Deputy Managing
Director, Address to the World Trade Organization General Council (May 18, 2004).
Being an academic in the past, the IMF Deputy Managing Director maintained that
neither the IMF, nor the World Bank should provide funding to promote liberalisation of
trade in the WTO. KRUEGER, supra note 42, at 35.
105. The practice of using financial assistance to promote international lawmaking is
not completely new. World Bank's InfoDev is one previous, but not as far-reaching,
example. This World Bank program on information technologies financed the work of a
group of consultants incorporated in the Secretariat of the WTO to provide technical
assistance in devising offers of market access, such as schedules of commitments and
lists of exemptions on basic telecommunications, in the process of negotiations on
telecommunication services. The influx of this type of "hybrid" policy advice and
assessment in international lawmaking, which is half public-half corporate, is important
to the understanding of the evolution of modern international law, particularly when
assistance is directed not only at training in negotiating techniques of treaties, but
specifically directed to guide their substantive content.
106. Anne Krueger refers to the debt crisis as an example of the potential functions of
analysis, research, and dissemination of ideas in the activities of these institutions. She
holds that promoting global conferences and publications such as the World Debt Tables,
World Economic Outlook, and World Development Reports on that particular area serves
to mitigate the "confusion," to produce a convergence of visions, and subsequently, of
policies. KRUEGER, supra note 42, at 25.
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products and services that are then used by their organs and exported to
the domestic level. 10 7 This "knowledge" is instrumental to advancing
and refining liberalization. The IMF and the World Bank, for example,
particularly are skilled in sectors such as foreign direct investment and
sustainable development, which are relevant for the WTO, while the
WTO has technical knowledge on the liberalisation of trade in sectors
such as services, which are relevant to the IMF and the World Bank.
The research machinery of these institutions produce and process
empirical, statistical, and economic data, as well as policy papers and
position documents that contribute to domestic policymaking and
reform. 0 8 These processes are vital since they function as the "scientific
foundation" of the rules and programs deriving from the IMF, the World
Bank, or the WTO. Thus, the type of research being promoted is
instrumental in the service of their pre-defined policy agendas.
Consequently, research activities inside these institutions are based on
specific policy assumptions and their outcomes tend to generate a
somewhat standardised type of results. In essence, these activities are
guided in accordance with the purposes of their constitutive treaties and
adapted to the prevailing ideas resulting from the balances of power held
inside these institutions.
Therefore, the production of research and ideas, and their
dissemination through technical assistance, capacity building, and
training, complements the rule-based coordination referred to in this
paper. An interesting example of this is how, in 1996, the World Bank
reinvented itself to become the so-called Bank of Knowledge. Within
this broad strategy, the World Bank is amplifying the function of trade in
the development process. It intensively addresses the theory and practice
of development from the trade angle and assigns significant resources to
trade-related research, training, and technical assistance. 109
107. For ethnographic research, based on the WTO's operations in Laos, on the
process of production of "knowledge" and the means through which the World Bank
obtains authority and exercises power, see Michael Goldman, The Birth of a Discipline:
Producing Authoritative Green Knowledge, World Bank-Style, 2 ETHNOGRAPHY 191-217
(2001). See also MICHAEL GOLDMAN, IMPERIAL NATURE: THE WORLD BANK AND
STRUGGLES FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2005).
108. On the strategic relevance of document production and its processes within the
machinery and functioning of the Fund, see RICHARD HARPER, INSIDE THE IMF: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF DOCUMENTS, TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATIONAL ACTION (1998).
109. The vision of the World Bank regarding trade matters is based on integrating
developing countries in the global economy through market access, export oriented
production, and attraction of foreign direct investment. In a scenario of decreasing
foreign aid, the World Bank amplifies the function of trade in the development process
by advocating a more intense concentration of development strategies on trade
liberalisation. For an example of the rationale developed by the World Bank and the
IMF, see World Trade Organisation, Market Access for Developing Country Exports-
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Consequently, the Bank has been able to progressively centralize the
multilateral strategy of technical assistance related to trade. In fact, this
financial institution already coordinates the Integrated Framework for
Trade-Related Technical Assistance for developing countries. 110 In this
sense, controlling the coordination of this type of soft-power strategy is
starting to be increasingly crucial in modern global politics.
Undoubtedly, coordinated institutional strategies based on these soft-
power approaches complement rule-based coordination among
international institutions to produce changes in institutional behaviour
and thus influence domestic policies.
IV. The Meaning of "Coherence" in International Law
The rule-based coordination structure of the IMF, the World Bank,
and WTO inevitably produces some perplexities. In essence, other
international institutions and sectors of international law are at a clear
disadvantage by not being included. The social values protected and
promoted by non-economic institutions such as the UNEP and the UN
human rights system, tend to have a lower comparative efficacy in
relation to the IMF, the World Bank, or WTO due to failures in their
institutional design and the inadequate allocation of resources to their
functioning.11' Consequently, excluding these institutions and their rules
from this model of trilateral coordination does not help to strike a
balance in their relations. Therefore, it seems reasonable to include non-
economic institutions as equal participants under this rule-based
coordination scheme. In this sense, inclusive horizontal coordination
could contribute to the progressive development of checks and balances
in global institutional architecture.
Currently, the policies of these institutions and those of the United
Nations system are not distanced only from each other, but almost
function on divergent tracks. 12 The package of instruments and tools
Selected Issues, WT/WGTDF/W/14 (Oct. 18, 2002).
110. This partnership functions under the leadership of the World Bank with the
assistance of an inter-institutional working group presided over by the WTO, and is
helped by bilateral donors and international institutions (IMF, ICC, UNEP, and
UNCTAD). The Integrated Framework encourages the inclusion of trade liberalisation in
the policies of developing countries, the negotiation of trade agreements, such as the
preparation for WTO accession, and the implementation of production adjustments.
111. For the list of institutions referred to in the Final Draft of the Uruguay Round
and the provisions regulating their legal relevance in WTO law, see World Trade
Organisation, Note by the Secretariat, Sub-committee on institutional, procedural and
legal matters-The WTO and other inter-governmental organisations, PC/IPL/W/2 (June
29, 1994).
112. It is revealing to compare the coordination mechanism of these three
organisations with the scheme of relations maintained by the WTO with the United
Nations. The WTO General Council requested the Secretariat to devise a "global
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advancing coordination between the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO
does not promote coherence with the remainder of institutions which
make up global institutional architecture. The search for "coherence"
through a reinforced mechanism of coordination limited to the three
global economic institutions is an oxymoron. These multilateral
institutions, and the ministries of finance and trade who administer them,
concentrate in an expanding field of public policy, the economy, which is
neither closed nor self-contained. The failure to include other
institutions in this framework of coordination is thus a wrong choice.
This mechanism of coordination creates a legal and institutional
structure at the service of a restricted concept of coherence. In doing so,
it inevitably discriminates against the social values protected and
promoted by other international norms and institutions. The terms of
reference to their coordination structure are a limited group of shared
values, which inevitably produce a particularly restricted phenomenon of
path dependence in their activities. The comparative institutional
advantage of these organisations, by administering access to finance and
markets, together with the efficacy of their specialised framework of
coordination, produces an imbalance in the proper functioning of
international law. Therefore, there is a need to reconsider their concept
of "coherence." Opting for a model of restricted coordination has a clear
political significance and important institutional and legal implications.
It also contrasts sharply with the ideal of an alternative wider, open, and
inclusive coordination structure. Whichever way we look at it, it is
scarcely coherent.
Michael Camdessus maintains that today, for the first time in
history, we perceive the need to organise and manage the world.1"3 It is
clear that interdependence requires new ways of handling governance on
agreement" with the United Nations based on the same relationship that has previously
existed between GATT and the United Nations. As a result, this three page "global
agreement" merely transcribes an exchange of notes between the Director General of the
WTO and the U.N. Secretary General. This exchange of notes determines that the
previous agreements and practices (described in U.N. Doc. AG. A/AC.179/5 (1976))
constitute an adequate foundation on which to continue their relations. However, that
second instrument again refers to an August 1952 exchange of letters between the U.N.
Secretary General and the GATT Secretariat where some broad commitments are finally
specified. See U.N. Doc. ONUE/5476/Add.12 (1974). For a document explaining this
perplexing process and transcribing the instruments, see World Trade Organisation,
Director General Report, Relations Between the WTO and United Nations, Arrangements
for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organisations, WT/GC/W/10
(Nov. 3, 1995).
113. See Michael Camdessus, The IMF at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: What
Has Been Learned? On Which Values Can We Establish a Humanised Globalization?, in
THE IMF AND ITS CRITICS: REFORM OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 427 (David
Vines & Christopher L. Gilbert eds., 2004).
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a global scale. In this sense, achieving coherence has to be approached
seriously. The ministers who administer the IMF, the World Bank, and
the WTO are well aware of the advantages of strengthening the
coordination of these three institutions. In this respect, managing the
integration of the international economy generates a sustained pressure
towards their coordination. 14 Nevertheless, this particular framework of
reinforced coordination has ignored the necessary inclusion of other
international institutions under the scheme. In this sense, honouring the
idea of coherence inevitably requires reforming these coordination
structures to include other key multilateral institutions.
In addition, the search for coherence in global policymaking
requires some type of integration of other rules of international law in the
processes and procedures of these three organisations. Embarking on
such an ambitious global project without paying any attention
whatsoever to the meaning of coherence rooted in our western legal
tradition is quite disconcerting. Any normative system requires some
minimal ordering. There has been a great deal of development in
modern legal thought regarding this question. In this sense, coherence is
defined generally as the absence of antinomies, or conflicts between
norms, within a legal system.1 15 This same meaning applies to modern
international law. Therefore, coherence as the absence of antinomies
should be the master value in any project of global institutional
coordination. It is clearly a more appropriate meaning of coherence than
the one employed in the management of the international economy by
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. As such, it is, therefore, the
legitimate point of departure for any global institutional project oriented
to achieve coherence in global policymaking. It would be a great
advance if ministers of finance and trade were to take into consideration
this well-founded legal concept when promoting a process of inter-
institutional coordination based on the idea of coherence.
At present, two great institutional visions are operating in parallel
and need to converge. The IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are
situated on one side, and on the other, a diverse group of specialised
bodies of the United Nations. In practice, the IMF, the World Bank, and
the WTO have full autonomy vis-A-vis the United Nations. To strike a
balance, the precarious institutional structure resulting from the 2002
United Nations Conference on Financing for Development has been
suggested as a forum for advancing coherence in trade, finance, and
114. Stephen A. Silard, International Economic Institutions: The Challenge of
Coordination, 4 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 67-89 (1989).
115. See NORBERTO BOBBIO, TEORiA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 216 (1991).
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development. 1 6 The position, resulting from this conference, was made
clear in the United Nations' Monterrey Consensus. The Final Statement
of this conference made an appeal for coherence in support of the
development and leadership process of the United Nations and the
United Nations Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC"). 1 7  In
addition, ECOSOC has begun to organise regular High Level Meetings
with the Bretton Woods institutions.' 18 These annual meetings, initiated
in 1998, were opened to the WTO in 2000 and, four years later, to the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"). l 19
Perhaps these initiatives could open up new paths and institutional
developments.120  In this respect, the latent function of coordination
attributed to ECOSOC by the United Nations Charter has to be upgraded
in relation to these economic institutions. Failing this, a new institution
needs to be created. Policy interdependence encourages deeper
institutional integration. Inevitably, the course of the three international
economic institutions and the United Nations system should converge,
but the path ahead is a long one.' 21  Therefore, it is important to
116. The WTO's Doha Declaration also addresses the relations between trade,
finance, and development through the establishment of a Working Group on Trade, Debt,
and Finance to examine the relationship between trade, debt, and finance. World Trade
Organisation, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/i, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002), at 36. The aim of this working group constituted on the initiative of
developing countries is to address and propose measures "to contribute to a durable
solution to the problem of external indebtedness of developing and least-developed
countries, and to strengthen the coherence of international trade and financial policies,
with a view to safeguarding the multilateral trading system from the effects of financial
and monetary instability." The task of coherence is now being also addressed by this
working group as well as in special sessions of the Committee for Trade and
Development. See generally World Trade Organization, Working Group on Trade, Debt,
and Finance, Note by the Secretariat: Towards Greater Coherence, Doc.
WT/WGTDF/W/17 (Nov. 13, 2002). See also World Trade Organization, Working
Group on Trade, Debt, and Finance, Report of the Meeting of 17 December 2002,
Doc.WT/WGTDF/M/4 (Jan. 17, 2003).
117. See United Nations, Final Outcome of the International Conference on Financing
for Development "Addressing systemic issues: enhancing coherence and consistency of
the international monetary financial and trading systems in support of development,"
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 198/3/Corr.1, 52-67 (Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Final Outcome].
118. Establishing these meetings was one of the several measures recommended by
the General Assembly in Resolution 50/227. See G.A. Res. 50/227, 88, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/50/227 (July 1, 1996).
119. The first Special High-Level Meeting of the ECOSOC, the IMF, the World
Bank, and the WTO was held on April 22, 2002 in New York. UNCTAD was
incorporated two years later, on April 26, 2004.
120. The Final Declaration appeals for these meetings to assume a preliminary role in
promoting dialogue and exchange of opinions in questions of coherence, coordination,
and cooperation in the context of implementation of the Monterrey Consensus. See Final
Outcome, supra note 117, at 69.
121. It is revealing example of the long-standing state of affairs that the first time the
President of the Bank addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations was just
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coordinate the ministers and national trade agencies with their
counterparts in finance and development on an international scale.
122
However, it is equally important also to include heads of other areas of
government, which, at best, are under-represented, in these forums. The
intense internationalisation of the activities of ministries of trade and
finance and their related agencies has fragmented foreign policies and
has led progressively to the creation of efficient, specialised international
institutions that extend their power, vis-a-vis other agencies, on a
domestic and international scale. This has been done mainly by
constructing international institutions that grant access to finance and
market access in exchange for state compliance with specific economic
''prescriptions."
Delivering coherence in global policymaking requires the present
status quo to be reformed by: (1) strengthening the international
institutional architecture in those fields of competence of other branches
of government; (2) increasing their international legislative and
regulatory activities; and (3) allowing them to share jurisdictional
competence with the Fund, the Bank, and WTO over access to finance
and market access. The mechanism of coordination of these economic
institutions is "searching for coherence" in the wrong place. Any model
of institutional coordination aimed at achieving coherence should be
based on the conventional and mainstream meaning of coherence in
law. 123  Coherence can only be achieved by avoiding contradiction.
Therefore, coherence can only be obtained through a wider and deeper
coordination with other international institutions administering
two years ago. See James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank Group, Address to the
United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Financing Development New York (Oct. 30,
2003).
122. There is no global meeting forum for finance, development, and trade ministries.
Up to now, the coordination of ministries of finance, development, and trade was
decentralised and indirect through high-level officials and staff of the IMF, the World
Bank, and the WTO.
123. Renato Ruggiero, the first Director-General of WTO referred to the management
of potential WTO-IMF conflicts as one of the advantages of the IMF-WTO agreement
when addressing some arising concerns among WTO delegates in relation to this
agreement: "[A]t times in the course of our work we may come upon possible policy
measures that the IMF or the World Bank may have proposed or may be advancing that
may not be obviously consistent with agreed rights and obligations under the WTO. This
could raise real subsequent difficulties for the Member concerned and for the
Membership" (emphasis added). World Trade Organisation, Statement by the Director-
General on Consultation and Coherence Agreements Between the WTO, the IMF and the
World Bank: Addendum, WT/L/194/Add.1 (Nov. 18, 1996). In his words, the agreement
"provides the mechanism" to address potential IMF and World Bank concerns on these
type of issues. Id. Of course, this sensible line of reasoning should also reasonably be
applied to the rest of international institutions by developing equivalent coordinating
structures with them.
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specialized areas of international law. Other policy choices, in essence,
are bluntly incoherent.
Fortunately, there have been some recent changes in attitude. In
regard to WTO, Supachai Panitchpakdi defined the area of "policy
coherence" during his first press conference as Director General, as an
area for improvement that could be much wider than the original Bretton
Woods institutions. Thus, he asserted the need to work in tandem with
the World Bank, the IMF, UNCTAD, UNEP, ILO, and the WHO in the
field of sustainable development. 124 His predecessor, Michael Moore,
also asserted the need to improve coordination with other institutions
when recalling the success of the WTO-IMF and WTO-World Bank
agreements. He said, "[W]e find ourselves operating at present mostly
on parallel tracks, and lacking policy guidance from our governing
bodies on how to make those tracks converge.', 125 Moore referred to the
risk of duplication and overlapping in a scenario in which international
institutions operate "in relative isolation from one another. '' 126 In fact, in
meetings of the former Administrative Coordination Committee of the
United Nations, he defended the creation of a group of experts "without
vested interests" to devise an inventory defining with greater precision
the functions and purposes of existing international institutions.
1 27
Certainly, there are several policy options that can be used to
achieve coherence in global policymaking. The reasonable policy is to
upgrade the coordination of international economic institutions with
other global non-economic institutions. However, it is not Secretariats
and staff of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO that can change
policy in this direction, but those domestic economic agencies that have
designed these institutions and now control their decision making
processes. In the absence of those changes, it is domestic non-economic
agencies that can help in this regard by taking a stronger and more
creative lead in international lawmaking. In this sense, it would be
helpful to develop new international rules that secure the functioning of
global economic institutions paying deference to the norms, expertise,
and findings of global non-economic institutions. In fact, the very idea
of coherence in international law suggests the need to do so.
124. See Supachai Panitchpakdi, World Trade Organization Director-General, First
Press Conference (Sept. 2, 2002).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Michael Moore, World Trade Organization Director General, Address:
Coherence in global economic policy-making: WTO cooperation with the IMF and the
World Bank, General Council informal meeting (Jan. 18, 2001).
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